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Abstract
Randomness extractors, which extract high quality (almost-uniform) random bits from biased
random sources, are important objects both in theory and in practice. While there have been
significant progress in obtaining near optimal constructions of randomness extractors in various
settings, the computational complexity of randomness extractors is still much less studied. In
particular, it is not clear whether randomness extractors with good parameters can be computed
in several interesting complexity classes that are much weaker than P.
In this paper we study randomness extractors in the following two models of computation:
(1) constant-depth circuits (AC0), and (2) the local computation model. Previous work in these
models, such as [38], [15] and [6], only achieve constructions with weak parameters. In this work
we give explicit constructions of randomness extractors with much better parameters. Our re-
sults on AC0 extractors refute a conjecture in [15] and answer several open problems there. We
also provide a lower bound on the error of extractors in AC0, which together with the entropy
lower bound in [38, 15] almost completely characterizes extractors in this class. Our results on
local extractors also significantly improve the seed length in [6]. As an application, we use our
AC0 extractors to study pseudorandom generators in AC0, and show that we can construct both
cryptographic pseudorandom generators (under reasonable computational assumptions) and un-
conditional pseudorandom generators for space bounded computation with very good parameters.
Our constructions combine several previous techniques in randomness extractors, as well as
introduce new techniques to reduce or preserve the complexity of extractors, which may be of
independent interest. These include (1) a general way to reduce the error of strong seeded
extractors while preserving the AC0 property and small locality, and (2) a seeded randomness
condenser with small locality.
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1 Introduction
Randomness extractors are functions that transform biased random sources into almost
uniform random bits. Throughout this paper, we model biased random sources by the
standard model of general weak random sources, which are probability distributions over
n-bit strings with a certain amount of min-entropy k.3 Such sources are referred to as
(n, k)-sources. In this case, it is well known that no deterministic extractors can exist for
one single weak random source even if k = n− 1; therefore seeded randomness extractors
were introduced in [32], which allow the extractors to have a short uniform random seed (say
length O(logn)). In typical situations, we require the extractor to be strong in the sense that
the output is close to uniform even given the seed. Formally, we have the following definition.
I Definition 1 ([32]). A function Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a seeded (k, ε) extractor
if for any (n, k) source X, we have
|Ext(X,Ud)− Um| ≤ ε.
Ext is strong if in addition |(Ext(X,Ud), Ud)−(Um, Ud)| ≤ ε, where Um and Ud are independent
uniform strings on m and d bits respectively, and | · | stands for the statistical distance.
Since their introduction, seeded randomness extractors have become fundamental objects
in pseudorandomness, and have found numerous applications in derandomization, complexity
theory, cryptography and many other areas in theoretical computer science. In addition,
through a long line of research, we now have explicit constructions of seeded randomness
extractors with almost optimal parameters (e.g., [17]). However, the complexity of randomness
extractors is still much less studied and understood. For example, while in general explicit
constructions of randomness extractors can be computed in polynomial time of the input
size, some of the known constructions are actually more explicit than that. These include for
example extractors based on universal hashing [8], and Trevisan’s extractor [36], which can
be computed by highly uniform constant-depth circuits of polynomial size with parity gates.
Thus a main question one can ask is: can we do better and construct good randomness
extractors with very low complexity?
This question is interesting not just by its own right, but also because such extractors,
as building blocks, can be used to potentially reduce the complexity of other important
objects. In this paper we study this question and consider the parallel and local complexity
of randomness extractors.
The parallel-AC0 model. The hierarchy of NC and AC circuits are standard models for
parallel computation. It is easy to see that the class of NC0 or even `-local functions for
small ` , which correspond to functions where each output bit depends on at most ` input
bits (including both the weak source and the seed), cannot compute strong extractors (since
one can just fix ` bits of the source). Thus, a natural relaxation is to consider the class AC0,
which refers to the family of polynomial-size and constant-depth circuits with unbounded
fan-in gates. Note that although we have strong lower bounds here for explicit functions,
it is still not clear whether some important objects, such as randomness extractors and
pseudorandom generators, can be computed in AC0 with good parameters. Thus the study
of this question also helps us better understand the power of this class.
3 A probability distribution is said to have min-entropy k if the probability of getting any element in the
support is at most 2−k.
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Viola [38] was the first to consider this question, and his result was generalized by
Goldreich et al. [15] to show that for strong seeded extractors, even extracting a single bit is
impossible if k < n/poly(logn). When k ≥ n/poly(logn), Goldreich et al. showed how to
extract Ω(logn) bits using O(logn) bits of seed, or more generally how to extract m < k/2
bits using O(m) bits of seed. Note that the seed length is longer than the output length.4
When the extractor does not need to be strong, they showed that extracting r + Ω(r) bits
using r bits of seed is impossible if k < n/poly(logn); while if k ≥ n/poly(logn) one can
extract (1 + c)r bits for some constant c > 0, using r bits of seed. All the positive results
here have error 1/poly(n).
Therefore, a natural and main open problem left in [15] is whether one can construct
randomness extractors in AC0 with shorter seed and longer output. Specifically, [15] asks if
one can extract more than poly(logn)r bits in AC0 using a seed length r = Ω(logn), when
k ≥ n/poly(logn). In [15] the authors conjectured that the answer is negative. Another open
question is to see if one can achieve better error, e.g., negligible error instead of 1/poly(n).
Goldreich et al. [15] also studied deterministic extractors for bit-fixing sources, and most
of their effort went into extractors for oblivious bit-fixing sources (although they also briefly
studied non-oblivious bit-fixing sources). An (n, k)-oblivious bit-fixing source is a string
of n bits such that some unknown k bits are uniform, while the other n− k bits are fixed.
Extractors for such sources are closely related to exposure-resilient cryptography [7, 24]. In
this case, a standard application of Håstad’s switching lemma [18] implies that it is impossible
to construct extractors in AC0 for bit-fixing sources with min-entropy k < n/poly(logn). The
main result in [15] is a theorem which shows the existence of deterministic extractors in AC0
for min-entropy k ≥ n/poly(logn) that output k/poly(logn) bits with error 2−poly(logn). We
emphasize that this is an existential result, and [15] did not give any explicit constructions
of such extractors.
The local model. Another relaxation, introduced by Bogdanov and Guo [6], is the notion of
sparse extractor families. These are families of functions for which each function in the family
has a small number of overall input-output dependencies (referred to as the sparsity, meaning
that the input-output dependency graph is sparse), while taking a random function from the
family serves as a randomness extractor. Such extractors can be used generally in situations
where hashing is used and preserving small input-output dependencies is needed. As an
example, the authors in [6] used such extractors to obtain a transformation of non-uniform
one-way functions into non-uniform pseudorandom generators that preserves output locality.
In this paper, we consider the condition of the family being `-local, which is a worst case
notion rather than the average case notion of sparsity. Furthermore, we will focus on the case
of strong extractor families. Note that a strong extractor family is equivalent to a strong
seeded extractor, since the randomness used to choose a function from the family can be
included in the seed. Thus, we study strong seeded extractors with small locality, i.e., for
any fixing of the seed, each output bit depends on at most ` input bits.
Note that an extractor family with m output bits and locality ` is automatically an
`m-sparse extractor family. Conversely, if an extractor is s-sparse, then half of its output
bits depend on at most 2s/m input bits, so by removing half of the output bits one could
obtain locality 2s/m; a technical point here is that one may need to drop different output
bits depending on the seed, but this does not affect the error of the extractor.
4 They also showed how to extract poly(logn) bits using an O(logn) bit seed, but the error of the extractor
becomes 1/poly(logn).
APPROX/RANDOM 2018
37:4 Randomness Extraction in AC0 and with Small Locality
The authors of [6] gave a construction of a strong extractor family for all entropy k with
output length m ≤ k, error ε, and sparsity O(n log(m/ε) log(n/m)), which corresponds to




m )) = Ω(n/k log(n/ε)) whenever k ≤ n/2. They also showed that
such sparsity is necessary whenever n0.99 ≤ m ≤ n/6 and ε is a constant. However, the main
drawback of the construction in [6] is that the family size is quite large. Indeed the family
size is 2nm, which corresponds to a seed length of at least nm.5 Therefore, a main open
problem in [6] is to reduce the size of the family (or, equivalently, the seed length).
De and Trevisan [11] obtained a strong extractor for (n, k) sources such that for any
fixing of the seed, each bit of the extractor’s output only depends on poly(logn) bits of the
source. However, their construction only works for k = δn where δ is any constant. Their
extractor has seed length d = O(logn) and outputs kΩ(1) bits, but the error is only n−α for
a small constant 0 < α < 1.
It is also worthwhile to compare our definition of a strong extractor family with small
locality to the definition of t-local extractors given by Vadhan [37]. For a t-local extractor,
one requires that for any fixing of the seed r, the output of the function Ext(x, r) as a whole
depends on only t bits of x. In contrast, our definition requires that each output bit of the
function Ext(x, r) depends on at most ` bits of x. It can be seen that a strong extractor with
sparsity t is automatically a t-local extractor, but the converse may not be true: a t-local
extractor may have locality t and sparsity up to mt. By a lower bound in [37], the parameter
t in local-extractors is at least Ω(nm/k), which is larger than m and matches the sparsity in
[6] and our results up to polylogarithmic factors. In this sense, our definition of extractor
with small locality is stronger than t-local extractors. Furthermore, the construction of
t-local extractors in [37], which uses the sample-then-extract approach, only works for large
min-entropy (at least k >
√
n); while our goal here is to construct strong extractor families
even for very small min-entropy, with locality ` m.
Our results
As in [38, 15], in this paper we obtain both negative results and positive results about
randomness extraction in AC0. While the negative results in [38, 15] provide lower bounds
on the entropy required for AC0 extractors, our negative results provide lower bounds on the
error such extractors can achieve. We show that such extractors (both seeded extractors and
deterministic extractors for bit-fixing sources) cannot achieve error better than 2−poly(logn),
even if the entropy of the sources is quite large. Specifically, we have
I Theorem 2. (General weak source) If Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a strong
(k = n− 1, ε)-extractor that can be computed by AC0 circuits of depth dth and size s, then
ε = 2−(O(log s))dth−1 log(n+d).
(Bit-fixing source) There is a constant c > 1 such that if Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a (k, ε)-
extractor for oblivious bit-fixing sources with k = n− (c log s)dth−1, that can be computed by
AC0 circuits of depth dth and size s, then ε = 2−(O(log s))dth−1 logn. 6
Thus, our results combined with the lower bounds on the entropy requirement in [38, 15]
almost completely characterize the power of randomness extractors in AC0.
We now turn to our positive results. As our first contribution, we show that the authors’
conjecture about seeded AC0 extractors in [15] is false. We give explicit constructions of
strong seeded extractors in AC0 with much better parameters. This in particular answers
open problems 8.1 and 8.2 in [15]. To start with, we have the following theorem.
5 In fact, the seed length is even larger since the seed is used to sample from a non-uniform distribution.
6 This holds even if we allow Ext to have a uniform random seed, see in the full version [10].
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I Theorem 3. For any constant c ∈ N, any k = Ω(n/ logc n) and any ε = 1/poly(n), there
exists an explicit construction of a strong (k, ε)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
that can be computed by an AC0 circuit of depth c+ 10, where d = O(logn) , m = kΩ(1) and
the extractor family has locality O(logc+5 n).
Note that the depth of the circuit is almost optimal, within an additive O(1) factor of
the lower bound given in [15]. In addition, our construction is also a family with locality
only poly(logn). Note that the seed length d = O(logn) is (asymptotically) optimal, while
the locality beats the one obtained in [6] (which is O(n/m log(m/ε) log(n/m)) = nΩ(1)) and
is within a log4 n factor to O(n/k log(n/ε)).
Our result also improves that of De and Trevisan [11], even in the high min-entropy case,
as our error can be any 1/poly(n) instead of just n−α for some constant 0 < α < 1. Moreover,
our seed length remains O(logn) even for k = n/poly(logn), while in this case the extractor
in [11] has seed length poly(logn).
Next, we can boost our construction to reduce the error and extract almost all the entropy.
We have
I Theorem 4. For any constant γ ∈ (0, 1), a, c ∈ N, any k = δn = Ω(n/ logc n), ε =
1/2O(loga n), there exists an explicit strong (k, ε)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
in AC0 with depth O(a+ c+ 1) where d = O((logn+ log(n/ε) log(1/ε)logn )/δ), m = (1− γ)k.
As our second contribution, we give explicit deterministic extractors in AC0 for oblivious
bit-fixing sources with entropy k ≥ n/poly(logn), which output (1 − γ)k bits with error
2−poly(logn). This is in contrast to the non-explicit existential result in [15]. Further, the
output length and error of our extractor are almost optimal, while the output length in [15]
is only k/poly(logn). Specifically, we have
I Theorem 5. For any constant a, c ∈ N and any constant γ ∈ (0, 1], there exists an explicit
deterministic (k = Ω(n/ loga n), ε = 2− logc n)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}(1−γ)k that can
be computed by AC0 circuits of depth O(a+ c+ 1), for any (n, k)-bit-fixing source.
For sparse extractor families, we can reduce the error of Theorem 3 while keeping the
locality small.
I Theorem 6. There exists a constant α ∈ (0, 1) such that for any k ≥ npoly(logn) and ε ≥
2−kα , there exists an explicit construction of a strong (k, ε)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d →
{0, 1}m, with d = O(logn+ log(n/ε) log(1/ε)logn ), m = k
Ω(1) and locality log2(1/ε)poly(logn).
We also give strong extractor families with small locality for min-entropy k as small
as log2 n. Our approach is to first condense it into another weak source with constant
entropy rate. For this purpose we introduce the following definition of a (strong) randomness
condenser with small locality.
I Definition 7. A function Cond : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n1 is a strong (n, k, n1, k1, ε)-
condenser if for every (n, k)-source X and independent uniform seed R ∈ {0, 1}d, R ◦
Cond(X,R) is ε-close to R ◦ D, where D is a distribution on {0, 1}n1 such that for any
r ∈ {0, 1}d, we have that D|R=r is an (n1, k1)-source. We say the condenser family has
locality ` if for every fixing of R = r, the function Cond(., r) can be computed by an `-local
function.
We now have the following theorem.
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I Theorem 8. For any k ≥ log2 n, there exists a strong (n, k, t = 10k, 0.08k, ε)-condenser
Cond : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}t with d = O(k) , ε = 2−Ω(k) and locality O(nk logn).
Combining the condenser with our previous extractors, we get strong extractor families
with small locality for any min-entropy k ≥ log2 n. Specifically, we have
I Theorem 9. There exits a constant α ∈ (0, 1) such that for any k ≥ log2 n, any con-
stant γ ∈ (0, 1) and any ε ≥ 2−kα , there exists a strong (k, ε)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n ×




In the above two extractors, our seed length is still much better than that of [6]. However,
our locality becomes slightly worse.
Related work, independent work and further results
The work of Dziembowski and Maurer [12] also gave extractors with small locality. However,
the model of the weak source studied there is uniform random bits subject to a bounded
leakage, which is more restrictive than the model of general weak random sources we consider
here. In particular, the analysis of [12], which uses a guessing game, may not work for general
weak random sources. A recent independent work by Papakonstantinou et. al [34] used
similar techniques as [12] and gave constructions of seeded extractors in the multi-stream
model [16]. Their main motivation and result is an extractor that can extract Ω(k) bits
from any (n, k) source with k = Ω(n), using O(logn log(n/ε)) bits of seed together with
two streams, O(log log(n/ε)) passes and O(log(n/ε)) space. However, it turns out that
their construction can also be realized in AC0 and also has the property of small locality.
Specifically, for an (n, k) source with k = δn = n/poly log(n) and error ε = 2−poly log(n), their
construction gives an AC0 extractor with seed length O( 1
δO(1)
logn log(n/ε)) and locality
O( 1
δO(1)
log(n/ε)). Their construction, which is based on randomly re-bucketing the bits of
the source into blocks and arguing this results in a block source, can be viewed as orthogonal
to our construction, which is based on hardness amplification. Compared to our results
(Theorem 4 and Theorem 6), they have a better dependence on ε but we have a better
dependence on δ and n. For very small entropy (e.g., k = log2 n), we can first use our
condenser and then apply their construction, which will give an extractor with seed length
O(k), output length Ω(k) and locality O(nk logn log(k/ε)).
Applications to pseudorandom generators in AC0
Like extractors, pseudorandom generators are also fundamental objects in the study of
pseudorandomness, and constructing “more explicit" pseudorandom generators is another
interesting question that has gained a lot of attention. A pseudorandom generator (or PRG
for short) is an efficient deterministic function that maps a short random seed into a long
output that looks uniform to a certain class of distinguishers.
I Definition 10. A function G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a pseudorandom generator for a class
C of Boolean functions with error ε, if for every function A ∈ C, we have that
|Pr[A(Um) = 1]− Pr[A(G(Un)) = 1]| ≤ ε.
Here we mainly consider two kinds of pseudorandom generators, namely cryptographic
PRGs, which are necessarily based on computational assumptions; and unconditional PRGs,
most notably PRGs for space bounded computation.
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Standard cryptographic PRGs (i.e., PRGs that fool polynomial time computation or
polynomial size circuits with negligible error) are usually based on one-way functions (e.g.,
[19]), and can be computed in polynomial time. However, more explicit PRGs have also
been considered in the literature, for the purpose of constructing more efficient cryptographic
protocols. Impagliazzo and Naor [23] showed how to construct such a PRG in AC0, which
stretches n bits to n+ logn bits. Their construction is based on the assumed intractability
of the subset sum problem. On the other hand, Viola [39] showed that there is no black-box
PRG construction with linear stretch in AC0 from one-way functions. Thus, to get such
stretch one must use non black-box constructions.
In [3, 4], Applebaum et al. showed that the existence of cryptographic PRGs in NC0 with
sub-linear stretch follows from a variety of standard assumptions, and they constructed a
cryptographic PRG in NC0 with linear stretch based on a specific intractability assumption
related to the hardness of decoding sparsely generated linear codes. In [2], Applebaum
further constructed PRG collections (i.e., a family of PRG functions) with linear stretch and
polynomial stretch based on the assumption of one-wayness of a variant of the random local
functions proposed by Goldreich [14].
In the case of unconditional PRGs, for d ≥ 5 Mossel et al. [29] constructed d-local PRGs




d , which were used by
Applebaum et al. [3] to give a 3-local PRG with linear stretch that fools all linear tests.
In the same paper, Applebaum et al. also gave a 3-local PRG with sub linear stretch that
fools sublinear-space computation. Thus, it remains to see if we can construct better PRGs
(cryptographic or unconditional) in NC0 or AC0 with better parameters.
Our PRGs. We show that under reasonable computational assumptions, we can construct
very good cryptographic PRGs in AC0 (e.g. with polynomial stretch and negligible error). In
addition, we show that we can construct very good unconditional PRGs for space bounded
computation in AC0 (e.g., with polynomial stretch).
We first give explicit cryptographic PRGs in AC0 based on the one-wayness of random
local functions, the same assumption as used in [2]. To state the assumption we first need
the following definitions.
I Definition 11 (Hypergraphs [2]). An (n,m, d) hypergraph is a graph over n vertices and
m hyperedges each of cardinality d. For each hyperedge S = (i0, i1, . . . , id−1), the indices
i0, i1, . . . , id−1 are ordered. The hyperedges of G are also ordered. Let G be denoted as
([n], S0, S1, . . . , Sm−1) where for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1, Si is a hyperedge.
I Definition 12 (Goldreich’s Random Local Function [14]). Given a predicate Q : {0, 1}d →
{0, 1} and an (n,m, d) hypergraph G = ([n], S0, . . . , Sm−1), the function fG,Q : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m is defined as follows: for input x, the ith output bit of fG,Q(x) is fG,Q(x)i = Q(xSi).
For m = m(n), the function collection FQ,n,m : {0, 1}s × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is defined via
the mapping (G, x)→ fG,Q(x), where G is sampled randomly by the s bits and x is sampled
randomly by the n bits.
For every k ∈ {0, 1}s, we also denote F (k, ·) as Fk(·).
I Definition 13 (One-wayness of a Collection of Functions). For ε = ε(n) ∈ (0, 1), a collection
of functions F : {0, 1}s × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is an ε-one-way function if for every efficient




[∃z ∈ A(k, y), z′ ∈ F−1k (y), z = z
′] < ε,
where k and x are independent and uniform.
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We now have the following theorem.
I Theorem 14. For any d-ary predicate Q, if the random local function FQ,n,m is δ-one-way
for some constant δ ∈ (0, 1), then we have the following results.
1. If there exists a constant α > 0 such that m ≥ (1 + α)n, then for any constant c > 1,
there exists an explicit cryptographic PRG G : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}t in AC0, where t ≥ cr and
the error is negligible7.
2. If there exists a constant α > 0 such that m ≥ n1+α, then for any constant c > 1 there
exists an explicit cryptographic PRG G : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}t in AC0, where t ≥ rc and the
error is negligible.
As noted in [2], there are several evidence supporting this assumption. In particular,
current evidence is consistent with the existence of a δ-one-way random local function FQ,n,m
with m ≥ n1+α for some constant α > 0.
Compared to the constructions in [2], our construction is in AC0 instead of NC0. However,
our construction has the following advantages.
We construct a standard PRG instead of a PRG collection, where the PRG collection is a
family of functions and one needs to randomly choose one function before any application.
The construction of a PRG with polynomial stretch in [2] can only achieve polynomially
small error, and for negligible error one needs to assume that the random local function
cannot be inverted by any adversary with slightly super polynomial running time. Our
construction, on the other hand, achieves negligible error while only assuming that the
random local function cannot be inverted by any adversary that runs in polynomial time.
Next we give an explicit PRG in AC0 with polynomial stretch, that fools space bounded
computation. It is a straight forward application of our AC0-extractor to the Nisan-Zuckerman
PRG [32].
I Theorem 15. For every constant c ∈ N and every m = m(s) = poly(s), there is an explicit
PRG g : {0, 1}r=O(s) → {0, 1}m in AC0, such that for any randomized algorithm A using
space s,
|Pr[A(g(Ur)) = 1]− Pr[A(Um) = 1]| = ε ≤ 2−Θ(log
c s),
where Ur is the uniform distribution of length r, Um is the uniform distribution of length m.
Compared to the Nisan-Zuckerman PRG [32], our PRG is in AC0, which is more explicit.
On the other hand, our error is 2−Θ(logc s) for any constant c > 0 instead of being exponentially
small as in [32]. It is a natural open problem to see if we can reduce the error to exponentially
small. We note that this cannot be achieved by simply hoping to improve the extractor,
since our negative result shows that seeded extractors in AC0 cannot achieve error better
than 2−poly(logn).
2 Lower bounds for error parameters of AC0 extractors
Our negative results about the error of AC0 extractors follow by a simple application of
Fourier analysis and the well known spectrum concentration theorem of AC0 functions [27].
We present it in Appendix A.
7 The error ε : N → [0, 1] is negligible if ε(n) = n−ω(1).
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3 Constructions of AC0 extractors for general weak sources
We now briefly describe our positive results. For details of constructions and proofs, please
refer to the full version [10]. We will extensively use the following two facts: the parity
and inner product over poly(logn) bits can be computed by AC0 circuits of size poly(n); in
addition, any Boolean function on O(logn) bits can be computed by a depth-2 AC0 circuit
of size poly(n).
3.1 The basic construction
All our constructions are based on a basic construction of a strong extractor in AC0 for any
k ≥ npoly(logn) with seed length d = O(logn) and error ε = n
−Ω(1). This construction is a a
modification of the Impagliazzo-Wigderson pseudorandom generator [21], interpreted as a
randomness extractor in the general framework found by Trevisan [36]. The IW-generator
first takes a Boolean function on logn bits, applies a series of hardness amplifications to get
another Boolean function on O(logn) bits, and then uses the Nisan-Wigderson generator [31]
together with the new Boolean function. The hardness amplification consists of three steps:
the first step, developed by Babai et al. [5], is to obtain a mild average-case hard function
from a worst-case hard function; the second step involves a constant number of substeps,
with each substep amplifying the hardness by using Impagliazzo’s hard core set theorem
[22]; the third step, developed by Impagliazzo and Wigderson [21], uses a derandomized
direct-product generator to obtain a function that can only be predicted with exponentially
small advantage.
Trevisan [36] showed that given an (n, k)-source X, if one regards the n bits of X as the
truth table of the initial Boolean function on logn bits and applies the IW-generator, then
by setting parameters appropriately one obtains an extractor. The reason is that for any
x ∈ supp(X) that makes the output of the extractor fail a certain statistical test T , one
can “reconstruct" x by showing that it can computed by a small size circuit, when viewing
x as the truth table of the function with T gates. Thus the number of such bad elements
x ∈ supp(X) is upper bounded by the total number of such circuits. This extractor works
for any min-entropy k ≥ nα.
However, this extractor itself is not in AC0 (which is not surprising since it can handle
min-entropy k ≥ nα). Thus, at least one of the steps in the construction of the IW-
generator/extractor is not in AC0. By carefully examining each step one can see that the only
step not in AC0 is actually the first step of hardness amplification (This was also pointed out
by [38]). Indeed, all the other steps of hardness amplification are essentially doing the same
thing: obtaining a function f ′ on O(logn) bits from another function f on O(logn) bits,
where the output of f ′ is obtained by taking the inner product over two O(logn) bit strings
s and r. In addition, s is obtained directly from part of the input of f ′, while r is obtained
by using the other part of the input of f ′ to generate O(logn) inputs to f and concatenating
the outputs. All of these steps can be done in AC0, assuming f is in AC0 (note that f here
depends on X).
We therefore modify the IW-generator by removing the first step of hardness amplification,
and start with the second step of hardness amplification with the source X as the truth table
of the initial Boolean function. Thus the initial function f can be computed by using the
logn input bits to select a bit from X, which can be done in AC0. Therefore the final Boolean
function f ′ can be computed in AC0. The last step of the construction, which applies the
NW-generator, is just computing f ′ on several blocks of size O(logn), which certainly is in
AC0. This gives our basic extractor in AC0.
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The analysis is again similar to Trevisan’s argument [36]. However, since we have removed
the first step of hardness amplification, now for any x ∈ supp(X) that makes the output of
the extractor to fail a certain statistical test T , we cannot obtain a small circuit that exactly
computes x. On the other hand, we can obtain a small circuit that can approximate x well,
i.e., can compute x correctly on 1− γ fraction of inputs for some γ = 1/poly(logn). We then
argue that the total number of strings within relative distance γ to the outputs of the circuit
is bounded, and therefore combining the total number of possible circuits we can again get a
bound on the number of such bad elements in supp(X). A careful analysis shows that our
extractor works for any min-entropy k ≥ n/poly(logn). However, to keep the circuit size
small we have to set the output length to be small enough, i.e., nα and set the error to be
large enough, i.e., n−β .
In Appendix B, we describe more details about the basic construction.
3.1.1 Error reduction
We now describe how we reduce the error of the extractor. We will borrow some techniques
from the work of Raz et al. [35], where the authors showed a general way to reduce the
error of strong seeded extractors. However, the techniques in Raz et al. [35] do not preserve
the AC0 property, thus our techniques are significantly different from theirs. Nevertheless,
our starting point is a lemma from [35], which roughly says the following: given any strong
seeded (k, ε)-extractor Ext with seed length d and output length m, then for any x ∈ {0, 1}n
there exists a set Gx ⊂ {0, 1}d of density 1−O(ε), such that if X is a source with entropy
slightly larger than k, then the distribution Ext(X,GX) is very close to having min-entropy
m−O(1). Here Ext(X,GX) is the distribution obtained by first sampling x according to X,
then sampling r uniformly in Gx and outputting Ext(x, r).
Giving this lemma, we can apply our basic AC0 extractor with error ε = n−β for some t
times, each time with fresh random seed, and then concatenate the outputs. By the above
lemma, the concatenation is roughly (O(ε))t-close to a source such that one of the output
has min-entropy m−O(1) (i.e., a somewhere high min-entropy source). By choosing t to be
a large enough constant the (O(ε))t can be smaller than any 1/poly(n). We now describe
how to extract from the somewhere high min-entropy source with error smaller than any
1/poly(n), in AC0. This is where our construction differs significantly from [35], as there one
can simply apply a good extractor for constant entropy rate.
Assume that we have an AC0 extractor Ext′ that can extract from (m,m−
√
m)-sources
with error any ε′ = 1/poly(n) and output length m1/3. Then we can extract from the
somewhere high min-entropy source as follows. We use Ext′ to extract from each row of the
source with fresh random seed, and then compute the XOR of the outputs. We claim the
output is (2−mΩ(1) + ε′)-close to uniform. To see this, assume without loss of generality that
the i’th row has min-entropy m−O(1). We can now fix the outputs of all the other rows,
which has a total size of tm1/3 
√
m as long as t is small. Thus, even after the fixing, with
probability 1 − 2−mΩ(1) , we have that the i’th row has min-entropy at least m −
√
m. By
applying Ext′ we know that the XOR of the outputs is close to uniform.
What remains is the extractor Ext′. To construct it we divide the source with length m
sequentially into m1/3 blocks of length m2/3. Since the source has min-entropy m −
√
m,
this forms a block source such that each block roughly has min-entropy at least m2/3 −
√
m
conditioned on the fixing of all previous ones. We can now take a strong extractor Ext′′ in
AC0 with seed length O(logn) and use the same seed to extract from all the blocks, and
concatenate the outputs. It suffices to have this extractor output one bit for each block.
Such AC0 extractors are easy to construct since each block has high min-entropy rate (i.e.,
1− o(1)). For example, we can use the extractors given by Goldreich et al. [15].
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It is straightforward to check that our construction is in AC0, as long as the final step of
computing the XOR of t outputs can be done in AC0. For error 1/poly(n), it suffices to take
t to be a constant and the whole construction is in AC0, with seed length O(logn). We can
even take t to be poly(logn), which will give us error 2−poly(logn).
3.1.2 Increasing output length
The error reduction step reduces the output length from m to m1/3, which is still nΩ(1). We
can increase the output length by using a standard boosting technique as that developed by
Nisan and Zuckerman [32, 40]. Specifically, we first use random bits to sample several blocks
from the source, using a sampler in AC0. We then apply our AC0 extractor on the blocks
backwards, and use the output of one block as the seed to extract from the previous block.
When doing this we divide the seed into blocks each with the same length as the seed of the
AC0 extractor, apply the AC0 extractor using each block as the seed, and then concatenate
the outputs. This way each time the output will increase by a factor of nΩ(1). Thus after a
constant number of times it will become say Ω(k). Since each step is computable in AC0, the
whole construction is still in AC0.
4 Explicit AC0 extractors for bit-fixing sources
Our explicit AC0 extractors for (oblivious) bit-fixing sources follow the high-level idea in [15].
Specifically, we first reduce the oblivious bit-fixing source to a non-oblivious bit-fixing source,
and then apply an extractor for non-oblivious bit-fixing sources. This approach is natural in
the sense that the best known extractors for oblivious bit-fixing sources (e.g., parity or [24])
can both work for small entropy and achieve very small error. Thus by the negative results
in [15] and our paper, none of these can be in AC0. However, extractors for non-oblivious
bit-fixing sources are equivalent to resilient functions, and there are well known resilient
functions in AC0 such as the Ajtai-Linial function [1].
The construction in [15] is not explicit, but only existential for two reasons. First, at that
time the Ajtai-Linial function is a random function, and there was no explicit construction
matching it. Second, the conversion from oblivious-bit fixing source to non-oblivious bit-fixing
source in [15] is to multiply the source by a random matrix, for which the authors of [15]
showed its existence but were not able to give an explicit construction. Now, the first obstacle
is solved by recent explicit constructions of resilient functions in AC0 that essentially match
the Ajtai-Linial function ([9, 28, 26]). Here we use the extractor in [26] that can output
many bits. For the second obstacle, we notice that the extractors for non-oblivious bit-fixing
sources in [9, 26] do not need the uniform bits to be independent, but rather only require
poly(logN)-wise independence if N is the length of the source.
By exploiting this property, we can give an explicit construction of the matrix used
to transfrom the original oblivious bit-fixing source. Our construction is natural and
simpler than that in [15], in the sense that it is a matrix over F2 while the matrix in [15]
uses fields of larger size. Specifically, we will take a seeded extractor and view it as a
bipartite graph with N = nO(1) vertices on the left, n vertices on the right and left degree
d = poly(logN) = poly(logn). We identify the right vertices with the n bits of the bit-fixing
source, and for each left vertex we obtain a bit which is the parity of its neighbors. The new
non-oblivious bit-fixing source is the N bit source obtained by concatenating the left bits.
Now suppose the original source has entropy k = δn for some δ ≥ 1/poly(logn), and
let T denote the unfixed bits. A standard property of the seeded extractor implies that
most of the left vertices have a good fraction of neighbors in T (i.e., an extractor is a good
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sampler), so that each left bit obtained from these vertices is uniform. Next we would like to
argue that they are poly(logN)-wise independent. For this we require the seeded extractor
to have a stronger property: that it is a design extractor as defined by Li [25]. Besides being
an extractor itself, a design extractor requires that any pair of left vertices have a small
intersection of neighbors. Assuming this property, it is easy to show that if we take any
small subset S of the “good" left vertices, then there is a bit in T that is only connected to
a single vertex in S (i.e., a unique neighbor). Thus the XOR of any small enough subset
of the “good" left bits is uniform, which indicates that they are some t-wise independent.
Several explicit constructions of design extractors were given in [25], and for our applications
it suffices to use a simple greedy construction. By adjusting the parameters, we can ensure
that t = poly(logN) which is enough for applying the extractor in [26]. In addition, the
degree d = poly(logN) so the parity of d bits can be computed in AC0.
Once we have the basic extractor, we can use the same techniques as in [15] to reduce
the error, and use the techniques by Gabizon et al.[13] to increase the output length (this is
also done in [15]). Note that the techniques in [13] require a seeded extractor. In order for
the whole construction to be in AC0, we use our previously constructed seeded extractor in
AC0 which can output (1− γ)k bits. Thus we obtain almost optimal explicit AC0 extractors
for oblivious bit-fixing sources. In contrast, the seeded extractor used in [15] only outputs
k/poly(logn) bits, and thus their (non-explicit) AC0 extractor for oblivious bit-fixing sources
also only outputs k/poly(logn) bits.
5 Extractors with small locality for low entropy
Our basic extractor (Theorem 3) also enjoys the property of small locality, but it only works
for large entropy. To get constructions for small min-entropy, we adapt the techniques in [6].
There the authors constructed a strong extractor family with small sparsity by randomly
sampling an m× n matrix M and outputting MX, where X is the (n, k)-source. Each entry
in M is independently sampled according to a Bernoulli distribution, and thus the family size
is 2nm. We derandomize this construction by sampling the second row to the last row using a
random walk on an expander graph, starting from the first row. For the first row, we observe
that the process of generating the entries and doing inner product with X can be realized by
read-once small space computation, thus we can sample the first row using the output of a
pseudorandom generator for space bounded computation (e.g., Nisan’s generator [30]). We
show that this gives us a very good condenser with small locality, i.e., Theorem 8. Combining
the condenser with our previous extractors we then obtain strong extractor families with
small locality.
6 Applications to pseudorandom generators
For cryptographic pseudorandom generators, we mainly adapt the approach of Applebaum
[2], to the AC0 setting. The construction of cryptographic pseudorandom generator families
in [2] is based on random local functions. Specifically, given a random bipartite graph with
n left vertices, m right vertices and right degree d (think of d as a constant), and a suitable
predicate P on d bits, Applebaum showed that based on a conjecture on random local
one-way functions, the m output bits obtained by applying P to the m subsets of input bits
corresponding to the hyper edges give a distribution with high pseudo Shannon entropy. He
then showed how to boost the output to have high pseudo min-entropy by concatenating
several independent copies. At this point he used an extractor in NC0 to turn the output
into a pseudorandom string.
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However, an extractor in NC0 needs to have a large seed length (i.e., Ω(n)), thus the
NC0 PRG constructed using this approach only achieves linear stretch. Another issue is that
the NC0 PRG is actually a collection of functions rather than a single function, because
the random bits used to sample the bipartite graph is larger than the output length, and is
treated as a public index to the collection of functions.
Here, by replacing the extractor with our AC0 extractor we can achieve a polynomial
stretch PRG (based on appropriate assumptions as in [2]), although now the PRG is in
AC0 instead of NC0. In addition, we can get a single PRG instead of a collection of PRG
functions, by including the random bits used to sample the bipartite graph as part of the
seed. Since in the graph each right vertex only has a constant number d of neighbors, the
sampling uses md logn bits and can be done in AC0. To ensure that the PRG has a stretch,
we take the sampled graph G and apply the same graph to several independent copies of n
bit input strings. We show that we can still use the method in [2] to argue that this gives
a a distribution with high pseudo Shannon entropy. We then use the same method as in
[2] to turn it into a distribution with high pseudo min-entropy, and finally we apply our
AC0 extractor. This way we ensure that the md logn bits used to sample the graph G are
“absorbed" by the stretch of the PRG, and thus we get a standard PRG instead of a collection
of PRG functions.
For PRGs for space bounded computation, we simply adapt the PRG by Nisan and
Zuckerman [32], which stretches O(S) random bits to any poly(S) bits that fool space S
computation. We now replace the seeded extractor used there by our AC0 extractor. Notice
that the Nisan-Zuckerman PRG simply applies the seeded extractor iteratively for a constant
number of times, so the whole construction is still in AC0.
7 Open problems
Our work leaves many natural open problems. First, in terms of the seed length and output
length, our AC0 extractor is only optimal when k = Ω(n). Is it possible to simultaneously
achieve optimal seed length and output length when k = n/poly(logn)? Second, can we
construct good AC0 extractors for other classes of sources, such as independent sources and
affine sources?
Turning to strong extractor families with small locality, again the parameters of our
constructions do not match the parameters of optimal seeded extractors. In particular, our
seed length is still O(k) when the min-entropy k is small. Can we reduce the seed length
further? We note that using our analysis together with the IW-generator/extractor, one can
get something meaningful (i.e., a strong extractor family with a relatively short seed and
small locality) even when k = nα for some α > 1/2. But it’s unclear how to get below this
entropy.
For pseudorandom generators in AC0, there are also many interesting open problems left.
For example, can we construct better cryptographic PRGs, or use weaker computational
assumptions? In particular, it would be nice to construct a cryptographic PRG with
polynomial stretch based on the one-wayness of a random local function with m = (1 + α)n
instead of m = n1+α as in our current construction. For space bounded computation, is it
possible to match the exponentially small error of the Nisan-Zukerman PRG? Taking one
step further, is it possible to construct PRGs in AC0 for space bounded computation, with
stretch matching the PRGs of Nisan [30] and Impagliazzo-Nisan-Wigderson [20]?
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A Lower bounds for Error parameters of AC0 extractors
Our negative results about the error of AC0 extractors follow by a simple application of
Fourier analysis and the well known spectrum concentration theorem of AC0 functions [27].
I Theorem 16 (LMN Theorem [27] [33]). Let f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} be computable by AC0




Now we prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Without loss of generality, let m = 1. Let’s transform the function
space of Ext to {−1, 1}n+d → {−1, 1}, achieving function f . Let ε0 = 1/2. By Theorem 16,
there exists t = O(log(s/ε0))dth−1 · log(1/ε0) = O(log s)dth−1 s.t.∑
S⊆[n+d],|S|≤t
f̂2S > 1− ε0 = 1/2.
Fix an S = S1 ∪ {i + n | i ∈ S2} with |S| ≤ t, where S1 ⊆ [n], S2 ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , d}. We
know that
f̂S = 〈f, χS〉 = 1− 2 Pr
u
[f(u) 6= χS(u)]
where u is uniformly drawn from {−1, 1}n+d.
For a ∈ {−1, 1}, let Xa be the uniform distribution over {−1, 1}n conditioned on∏




i∈S2 Ri = b. So χS(x ◦ r) = ab for x ∈ supp(Xa), r ∈ supp(Rb). For special
situations, saying S1 = ∅ (or S2 = ∅ ), let Xa (or Rb) be uniform.
As Ext is a strong (k, ε)-extractor, Rb only blows up the error by 2. Also note that by
definition, Xa has entropy n− 1. So
dist(f(Xa ◦Rb), U) ≤ 2ε,
where U is uniform over {−1, 1}.
So

















4 |Pr[f(Xa ◦Rb) 6= ab]− 1/2|
≤ 2ε. (1)
Hence
|f̂S | = |1− 2 Pr
u
[f(u) 6= χS(u)]| = 2|Pr
u
[f(u) 6= χS(u)]− 1/2| ≤ 4ε.































≤ ( e(n+d)t )
t = 2O(t log(n+d)) = 2O(log s)dth−1 log(n+d),
ε = 2−O(log s)dth−1 log(n+d).
The second assertion follows from a similar argument which is deferred to the full
version [10]. J
B The basic construction of extractors in AC0
Our basic construction is based on the general idea of I-W generator [21]. In [36], Trevisan
showed that I-W generator is an extractor if we regard the string x drawn from the input
(n, k)-source X as the truth table of a function fx s.t. fx(〈i〉), i ∈ [n] outputs the ith bit of x.
The construction of I-W generator involves a process of hardness amplifications from a
worst-case hard function to an average-case hard function. There are mainly 3 amplification
steps. Viola [38] summarizes these results in details, and we review them again. The first
step is established by Babai et al. [5], which is an amplification from worst-case hardness to
mildly average-case hardness.
I Definition 17. A boolean function f : {0, 1}l → {0, 1} is δ-hard on uniform distributions for
circuit size g, if for any circuit C with at most g gates (size(C) ≤ g), we have Prx←U [C(x) =
f(x)] < 1− δ.
I Lemma 18 ([5]). If there is a boolean function f : {0, 1}l → {0, 1} which is 0-hard
for circuit size g = 2Ω(l) then there is a boolean function f ′ : {0, 1}Θ(l) → {0, 1} that is
1/poly(l)-hard for circuit size g′ = 2Ω(l).
The second step is an amplification from mildly average-case hardness to constant average-
case hardness, established by Impagliazzo [22].
I Lemma 19 ([22]).
1. If there is a boolean function f : {0, 1}l → {0, 1} that is δ-hard for circuit size g where
δ < 1/(16l), then there is a boolean function f ′ : {0, 1}3l → {0, 1} that is 0.05δl-hard for
circuit size g′ = δO(1)l−O(1)g.
f ′(s, r) = 〈s, f(a1) ◦ f(a2) ◦ · · · ◦ f(al)〉
Here |s| = l, |r| = 2l and |ai| = l,∀i ∈ [l]. Regarding r as a uniform random string,
a1, . . . , al are generated as pairwise independent random strings from the seed r.
2. If there is a boolean function f : {0, 1}l → {0, 1} that is δ-hard for circuit size g where
δ < 1 is a constant, then there is a boolean function f ′ : {0, 1}3l → {0, 1} that is
1/2−O(l−2/3)-hard for circuit size g′ = l−O(1)g, where
f ′(s, r) = 〈s, f(a1) ◦ f(a2) ◦ · · · ◦ f(al)〉.
Here |s| = l, |r| = 2l and |ai| = l,∀i ∈ [l]. Regarding r as a uniform random string,
a1, . . . , al are generated as pairwise independent random strings from the seed r.
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The first part of this lemma can be applied for a constant number of times to get a
function having constant average-case hardness. After that the second part is usually applied
for only once to get a function with constant average-case hardness such that the constant is
large enough (at least 1/3).
The third step is an amplification from constant average-case hardness to even stronger
average-case hardness, developed by Impagliazzo and Widgerson [21]. Their construction uses
the following Nisan-Widgerson Generator [31] which is widely used in hardness amplification.
I Definition 20 ((n,m, k, l)-design and Nisan-Widgerson Generator [31]). A system of sets
S1, S2, . . . , Sm ⊆ [n] is an (n,m, k, l)-design, if ∀i ∈ [m], |Si| = l and ∀i, j ∈ [m], i 6=
j, |Si ∩ Sj | ≤ k.
Let S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} be an (n,m, k, l) design and f : {0, 1}l → {0, 1} be a boolean
function. The Nisan-Widgerson Generator is defined as NWf,S(u) = f(u|S1) ◦ f(u|S2) ◦ · · · ◦
f(u|Sm). Here u|Si = ui1 ◦ ui2 ◦ · · · ◦ uim assuming Si = {i1, . . . , im}.
Nisan and Widgeson [31] showed that the (n,m, k, l)-design can be constructed efficiently.
I Lemma 21 (Implicit in [31]). For any α ∈ (0, 1), for any large enough l ∈ N, for any
m < exp{αl4 }, there exists an (n,m,αl, l)-design where n = b
10l
α c. This design can be
computed in time polynomial of 2n.
The following is the third step of hardness amplification.
I Lemma 22 (Implicit in [21]). For any γ ∈ (0, 1/30), if there is a boolean function f :
{0, 1}l → {0, 1} that is 1/3-hard for circuit size g = 2γl, then there is a boolean function
f ′ : {0, 1}l′=Θ(l) → {0, 1} that is (1/2 − ε)-hard for circuit size g′ = Θ(g1/4ε2l−2) where
ε ≥ (500l)1/3g−1/12.
f ′(a, s, v1, w) = 〈s, f(a|S1 ⊕ v1) ◦ f(a|S2 ⊕ v2) ◦ · · · f(a|Sl ⊕ vl)〉
Here (S1, . . . , Sl) is an (|a|, l, γl/4, l)-design where |a| = b 40lγ c. The vectors v1, . . . , vl are
obtained by a random walk on an expander graph, starting at v1 and walking according to w
where |v1| = l, |w| = Θ(l). The length of s is l. So l′ = |a|+ |s|+ |v1|+ |w| = Θ(l).
Our basic construction is an adjustment of the IW-Extractor.
I Construction 23. For any c2 ∈ N+ such that c2 ≥ 2 and any k = Θ(n/ logc2−2 n), let X
be an (n, k)-source . We construct a strong (k, 2ε) extractor Ext0 : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
where ε = 1/nβ, β = 1/600, d = O(logn), m = kΘ(1). Let U be the uniform distribution of
length d.
1. Draw x from X and u from U . Let f1 : {0, 1}l1 → {0, 1} be a boolean function such that
∀i ∈ [2l1 ], f1(〈i〉) = xi where l1 = logn.
2. Run amplification step of Lemma 19 part 1 for c2 times and run amplification step of
Lemma 19 part 2 once to get function f2 : {0, 1}l2 → {0, 1} from f1 where l2 = 3c2+1l1 =
Θ(logn).
3. Run amplification step Lemma 22 to get function f3 : {0, 1}l3 → {0, 1} from f2 where
l3 = Θ(logn).
4. Construct function Ext0 such that Ext0(x, u) = NWf3,S(u).
Here S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} is a (d,m, θl3, l3)-design with θ = l1/(900l3), d = b10l3/θc,
m = b2
θl3
4 c = bn 13600 c.
I Lemma 24. In Construction 23, Ext0 is a strong (k, 2ε) extractor.
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The proof follows from the “Bad Set” argument given by Trevisan [36]. In Trevisan [36]
the argument is not explicit for strong extractors. Here our argument is explicit for proving
that our construction gives a strong extractor.
Proof. We will prove that for every (n, k)-source X and for every A : {0, 1}d+m → {0, 1}
the following holds.
|Pr[A(Us ◦ Ext0(X,Us)) = 1]− Pr[A(U) = 1]| ≤ 2ε
Here Us is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}d and U is the uniform distribution over
{0, 1}d+m.
For every flat (n, k)-source X, and for every (fixed) function A, let’s focus on a set
B ⊆ {0, 1}n such that ∀x ∈ supp(X), if x ∈ B, then
|Pr[A(Us ◦ Ext0(x, Us)) = 1]− Pr[A(U) = 1]| > ε.
According to Nisan and Widgerson [31], we have the following lemma.
I Lemma 25 (Implicit in [31] [36]). If there exists an A-gate such that
|Pr[A(Us ◦ Ext0(x, Us)) = 1]− Pr[A(U) = 1]| > ε,
then there is a circuit C3 of size O(2θl3m), using A-gates, that can compute f3 correctly for
1/2 + ε/m fraction of inputs.
Here A-gate is a special gate that can compute the function A.
By Lemma 25, there is a circuit C3 of size O(m2θl3) = O(2
5θl3
4 ) = O(n1/720), using
A-gates, that can compute f3 correctly for 1/2 + ε/m ≥ 1/2 + 1/n1/400 fraction of inputs.
By Lemma 22, there is a circuit C2, with A-gates, of size at most Θ(n
1
30 ) which can
compute f2 correctly for at least 2/3 fraction of inputs.
According to Lemma 19 and our settings, there is a circuit C1, with A-gates, of size
n
1
30 poly logn which can compute f1 correctly for at least 1− 1/(c1 logc2 n) fraction of inputs
for some constant c1 > 0.
Next we give an upper bound on the size of B. ∀x ∈ B, assume we have a circuit
of size S = n1/30poly(logn), using A-gates, that can compute at least 1 − 1/(c1 logc2 n)
fraction of bits of x. The total number of circuits, with A-gates, of size S is at most
2Θ(mS logS) = 2n1/15poly(logn), as A is fixed and has fan-in m + d = O(m). Each one of







≤ (e · c1 logc2 n)n/(c1 log
c2 n) = 2O(n/ logc2−1 n)
number of x. So
|B| ≤ 2n
1/15poly(logn)2O(n/ log
c2−1 n) = 2O(n/(log
c2−1 n).
As X is an (n, k)-source with k = Θ(n/ logc2−2 n),
Pr[X ∈ B] ≤ |B| · 2−k ≤ ε.
Then we know,












37:20 Randomness Extraction in AC0 and with Small Locality
I Lemma 26. The seed length of construction 23 is O(logn).
Proof. We know that l1 = logn, l2 = 3c2+1l1 = Θ(logn), l3 = Θ(logn). Also S is a
(d10l3/ce = Θ(l3),m, cl3, l3)-design. So d = b10l3/cc = Θ(l3) = Θ(logn). J
I Lemma 27. The function Ext0 in Construction 23 is in AC0. The circuit depth is c2 + 5.
The locality is Θ(logc2+2 n) = poly(logn).
Please refer to the full version [10] for the proof of this lemma.
According to to Lemma 24, Lemma 26, Lemma 27, we have the following theorem.
I Theorem 28 (The basic construction). For any c ∈ N, any k = Θ(n/ logc n), there exists
an explicit strong (k, ε)-extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m in AC0 of depth c + 7,
where ε = n−1/600, d = O(logn), m = bn 13600 c and the locality is Θ(logc+4 n) = poly logn.
